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Review: Ken Booth & Tim Dunne, Worlds in Collision: Terror and
the Future of Global Order
By Navraj Singh Ghaleigh
SPECIAL FORUM ISSUE: THE WORLD WE (INTERNATIONAL LAWYERS) ARE
IN:  LAW AND POLITICS ONE YEAR AFTER 9/11.  Ken Booth  &  Tim Dunne,
Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order. Palgrave Macmillan:
Basingstoke & New York 2002. 384 pages, paperback, £14.99, ISBN 0-333-99805-7
by Navraj Singh Ghaleigh* Two shimmering 1,350-foot-tall, 110-story, stainless steel
towers (which tourists simply call "The Twin Towers") are flanked by a plaza larger
than Piazza San Marco in Venice.  When completed,  these solid,  banal  monoliths
came  to  overshadow  Lower  Manhattan's  cluster  of  filigreed  towers,  which  had
previously been the romantic evocation that symbolized the very concept of "skyline".
Ten million square feet  of  office  space are offered here:  7  times the  area of  the
Empire State Building, 4 times that of the Pan Am. The public agency that built them
(Port  Authority  of  New  York  and  New  Jersey)  ran  amok  with  both  money  and
aesthetics…(1) I. Introduction [1] This unexceptional description from a guide book
sparks our memory as keenly as endless reruns of planes, fireballs and apocalyptic
dust clouds chasing office workers. The references to icons of Renaissance Europe
and American modernity remind us of the magnitude, the ambition, of what once was.
After  the  fact,  the  scale  of  the  structures  is  fathomable  only  in  statistical  form.
Likewise the human suffering inflicted. Just as ‘1 and 2 World Trade Center' provided
visual orientation points for New Yorkers, the date of their demise gives us a temporal
point  of  reference  we  could  all  have  done  well  without.  Standing  a  mere  twelve
months from those events, the sense of uncertainty and incomprehension remains
great.  Questions  abound.  Were  the  attacks  the  first  in  a  series  marking  the
commencement of a ‘clash of civilisations'? What is the substance of this conflict and
its resolution? What are the implications of American hegemony? Most pertinently for
present purposes, what is the role of law in this conflict? [2] In the pages of this highly
readable volume, Ken Booth and Tim Dunne of the University of Wales Aberystwyth,
have  assembled  a  first  class  collection  of  responses  to  such  questions.  With
remarkable speed (the book was published in June 2002), the editors have managed
to garner contributions from a genuinely stellar group of scholars of whom Francis
Fukuyama, Noam Chomsky, Michael Byers and Robert Keohane are merely the best
known. The differences in understanding the post-9/11 world are often sharp. These
cleavages sometimes arise from geographical viewpoints. Occasionally divergences
appear to originate in disciplinary concerns (international relations scholars feature
most prominently,  although political  economists,  international  lawyers,  political  and
social  theorists are also present).  They are sometimes straightforwardly located in
political differences. Had this book arisen from an academic conference the personal
and  intellectual  clashes  would  have  been  absorbing.  What  price  Fukuyama  and
Chomsky in  the same room, or  An-Na'im and Waltz? Precisely because of  these
internal frictions, the reader is presented with a variety of accounts, analyses and
conclusions that cover a broad spectrum of positions in an engaging manner. [3] No
short review can do full justice to a collection with thirty-one chapters. Instead, I focus
on a small number of themes that feature prominently and are of particular relevance
to lawyers. Given the diversity of materials, this means that much fascinating material
goes unsurveyed. Nonetheless, by training our attention on two sets of oppositions
(cultural convergence versus divergence, and new realism in international relations
theory versus the idealism on public international and human rights lawyers), I seek to
demonstrate  that  this  intelligently  heterogeneous  collection  makes  a  significant,
timeous,  contribution  to  our  comprehension  of  the  ‘new'  global  order.  II.  The
Convergence Thesis v. Divergence [4] Practically everyone who makes their living
by writing has dashed off a piece on 9/11. For many this has necessitated the eating
of humble pie and the re-working of previous frameworks. For others, such as Sam
Huntington, there has been a gleeful dusting down of previously embattled theses.(2)
Francis Fukuyama and his ‘End of History' thesis, intuitively belong to the first group
but, he argues here, better fits with the latter.(3) Fukuyama's (in)famous claim of now
a  decade's  vintage  is  that  the  evolution  of  societal  governance  has  reached  its
apotheosis in the form of modern liberal democracy combined with market capitalism,
and that  this  will  henceforth  be  the  dominant  form of  government.  Written  in  the
aftermath  of  the  Soviet  Union's  implosion,  the  triumph  of  such  values  seemed
plausible, if not mildly bleak. But post-9/11 (and the prior sustained backlash against
‘globalisation'), Fukuyama seems less controversial than irrelevant. Not so, says he.
He puts his core beliefs as proudly as before: Democracy, individual rights, the rule of
law, and prosperity based on economic freedom represent universal aspirations that
will ultimately be shared by people all over the world, if given the opportunity. (p. 28)
[5]  Thus, our current conflict  is not a Huntingtonian ‘clash of  civilisations',  for  that
rubric is both over- and under-inclusive. There is a clash not between ‘Islamic culture'
and ‘Western culture', but rather of ‘Islamo-Fascism' with ‘Modernity'. The nub of the
conflict is modernity's key project of separating church/religion and state. Fukuyama
argues  that  this  separation  is  a  necessary  feature  of  a  peaceful  community  of
societies ("if politics is based on something like religion, there will never be any civil
peace because people cannot  agree on fundamental  religious values"  (p.  30)),  a
desirable one, and an inevitable one. Such optimism is based on his view that, There
is  an  underlying  historical  mechanism  that  encourages  a  long-term  convergence
across cultural boundaries, first and most powerfully in economics, then in the realm
of politics and finally (and most distinctly) in culture. (p. 29) [6] Thus, in its tenacious
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adherence to religious intolerance (understood as the opposite of religious pluralism),
Islam has propagated a broad based constituency hostile to western pluralism and
one which values religious identity  above other political  values. Grown out of  this
"radicalised population" are Islamo-Fascists – funded by Saudi Arabia, inspired by its
puritanical  Wahabbi  sect  and  springing  from  the  fertile  soil  of  Middle  Eastern
economic  stagnation  and  political  authoritarianism.  Assuming  we  accept  such  a
description, what of Fukuyama's conclusions? By definition, the oppositions he casts
are unsustainable. Whence a resolution? Fukuyama relies, in a rather underspecified
manner, on the "inner historical logic of political secularism", which according to his
‘logic  of  history'  approach  will  lead  to  a  convergence  of  societies  along  current
western lines. After all, he writes, Western institutions hold all the cards and for that
reason will continue to spread across the globe in the long run. (p. 35) [7] As pointed
out by Bhikhu Parekh in his chapter – "Terrorism or intercultural dialogue?" – it is just
this sort of discourse that infuriates ‘Islamicists', (or indeed anyone outside the gilded
circle of Western globalisation) and gives rise to the, "supportive or acquiescent body
of  people,  a  justifying  ideology,  and  widely  perceived  grievances  around  which
[terrorists] mobilize support" (p. 272). Indeed, the grim causal chain associated with
such  high-handedness  is  familiar  to  anyone  aware  of  the  British  government's
brutalisation of young Northern Irish Catholic men in the 1970s and 1980s. Parekh is
predictably  less  willing  than  Fukuyama  to  blame  Islamic  terrorism  alone  for  our
current  predicament  and instead notes that  after  an initial  period  of  maturity  and
multilateralism, the USA (after the "axis of evil" speech of January 2002) has slipped
into  modes  of,  rhetoric  and  behaviour  [which]  are  sadly  beginning  to  display  a
remarkable  resemblance  to  those  of  the  terrorists.  The latter  call  the  US an evil
civilisation, the US says the same about them. They say they are fighting for ‘eternal
moral verities', the US says it is fighting for values that are ‘right and unchanging for
all people everywhere'…both want to stand and act alone, are driven by rage and
hatred,  and  claim  absolute  superiority  for  their  respective  ways  of  life.  (p.  273)
Presumably one can disagree with both the strength of Parekh's critique (especially
his  tendency  towards  factual  equivalences)  and  much  of  the  US  government's
response  to  9/11.  [8]  Of  no  small  interest  is  Parekh's  proposed  solution  to  this
apparent stand off. Whereas Fukuyama trusts to the unshakable logic of historical
evolution to ensure the hegemony of liberalism, Parekh places his faith in dialogue (in
concert with financial squeezes, anti-terrorist intelligence, and, "when necessary, a
judicious use of force") as the surest means to, address the deeper roots of terrorism
that  drive  otherwise  decent  men  and  women  to  build  up  enormous  rage  and
hatred…If we are to tackle the roots of terrorism, we need to enter their  world of
thought,  understand  their  grievances  and  explore  why  they  think  we  bear
responsibility for these. (p. 274) A hint at the substance of this dialogue is given in the
following extracts from Parekh's staged oppositionals  – You,  the United States of
America, are driven by overweening ambition to dominate the world…despite all your
talk of human rights and democracy, whenever progressive forces emerged in many
parts  of  the  world,  you  subverted  them,  as  when  you  toppled  Mussadiq  in  Iran,
Lumumba in the Congo and Allende in Chile; when you trained and helped terrorists
in  Guatemala,  Nicaragua,  Angola  and  Argentina;  when  you  endorsed  the  mass
murders  of  Samuel  Doe,  Suharto  and  Pinochet,  and  when  you  invaded
Grenada…Muslims have remained backward, divided and confused [and] the blame
for that lies at the doors of colonial powers, and more recently at yours. You support
despotic and feudal regimes in Muslim countries, and actively help them or at least
acquiesce when they crush democratic movements. (pp. 276-279) And so on. The
other side of this hypothetical dialogue proceeds as follows: You, Muslims, misleading
claim  that  yours  is  a  religion  of  peace.  Islam  is  an  absolutist  religion  claiming
superiority over all others…You talk of your great civilisation [but] all Muslim societies
are  corrupt,  autocratic,  degenerate,  materialistic,  violent  and  oppressive  of  their
minorities,  women  and  dissident  sects…It  is  about  time  you  began  to  think  and
behave like adults taking charge of  your destiny rather than as children passively
praying  for  a  Western  Santa  Claus  to  bring  you  the  gifts  of  new  ideas  and
institutions…Contrary  to  what  your  conservative  leaders  say,  millions  of  Muslims
when given a choice have opted for many a Western value and practice…it is about
time you acknowledged the reality of there choices. (pp. 279-281) [9] Such are the
‘discursive parameters' of Parekh's framework. But as in his recent book, Rethinking
Multiculturalism(4), all that this formula can promise is a straightforward compromise
between universalism and objectionably chauvinistic culturalism. According to Parekh
at least, an appeal to universal moral normativity generally suffices – viz his response
to the Satanic Versescontroversy and his stance of siding with ethnic minority groups
in  Europe  over  issues  of  Muslim  headscarves,  Sikh  turbans  and  non-Christian
religious  schooling  whilst  maintaining  the  legitimacy  of  according  priority  of  long
standing institutions and customs. In essence, we are left with a sort of liberalism
which,  through  a  process  of  give-and-take,  is  capable  of  integrating  a  variety  of
minority groups, including Muslims, into secular societies. The upshot then is not far
from  Fukuyama.  Nor  is  any  reason  given  for  its  likely  mechanisms  of
operationalisation,  much  less  reasons  for  success.  III.  New  Realism  v.  Legal
Idealism [10] From the grand themes of trans-cultural discourse and the inescapable
logic of history, another focus brings us sharply to the business end of 9/11. Drawn
from  the  school  of  neo-realism  in  international  relations  theory,  a  second  set  of
authors is led by their movement's founder (Kenneth Waltz) in re-asserting the basic
postulates of their stark creed – that the external relations of nations are driven by
their struggle for supremacy over each other, which is identified as the sole means of
ensuring their own security. The rational pursuit of hegemony is not merely an option,
but the only sure means of attaining survival in the anarchy of inter-state relations. It
unsurprising that  adherents  of  this  view are frequently  located to  the  right  of  the
political spectrum. But it is somewhat surprising that these are also those that place
the least stock in 9/11 as a pivotal historical moment. Colin Gray (who served on
Reagan's  ‘General  Advisory  Committee  on  Arms  Control  and  Disarmament'  from
1982-1987) even goes so far as to claim that, I strongly suspect that history textbooks
a century hence will vary with reference to September 11 only insofar as some will
accord the events of that day a fat footnote, while others will allow it a paragraph in
the text. (p. 226) [11] The basis for this downplaying is that 9/11 and its consequences
do nothing to alter the basic structures of realism's canon – that great powers seeks
power and influence in pursuit of their national interests in an anarchic world. After all,
since two world wars and the Holocaust have, failed to effect radical change in the
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means  and  methods  of  world  politics,  it  is  hardly  likely  that  isolated  terroristic
atrocities,  no  matter  how  televisual,  would  succeed  in  their  turn.  (p.  227)  [12]
Somewhat depressingly, evidence for this claim is not a scarce resource. Realism is a
strongly state-centrist belief system. Although al-Qaeda's status is clearly different, it
is  nonetheless  true  that  without  hijacking  the  territorial  space  and  sovereigntist
capacities of Afghanistan, it could not have organised itself as freely as it did. Indeed,
al-Qaeda effectively had to take over this nation-state, ably abetted by the Taliban, in
order to achieve its goals. On the other side of the conflict, we note that it was not
NATO,  the  UN or  the  EU that  has  led  the  ‘War  on  Terrorism'  but  the  American
hegemon. True, the first phase of the US's response sought the support of its allies,
but unilateralism quickly outstripped that dovish-ness (5) and it is not clear that even
the obedient UK will now support an invasion of Iraq. To the counter that non-state
actors  will  continue to  afflict  "ingenious"  attacks,  potentially  threatening  the  West,
Gray coolly remarks, the measured yet lethal American response has revealed to all
interested observers just what it means to be a hegemon.(6) (p. 232) [13] This leads
to the next  step of  the argument – the hegemon-as-sheriff.  No doubt to Parekh's
chagrin, Gray has no time for "opulent international debating fora" and doubts their
ability to "handle the strategic traffic when disorder needs to be stamped on." (p. 232)
Only the prosaic violence of warfare can succeed in this task, and at present, only the
US can undertake this  executive  function.  It  would  not  do  so  in  a  carte  blanche
manner, but only with an attentiveness to its own interests which entails the belief that
the USA "has rights that match its burdensome duties," (p. 233) which allow unilateral
decisions to withdraw from treaty obligations.(7) For good, and occasionally for ill, and
not entirely by grand design and purpose, the United States is the keystone in the
arch of a hegemonic order in world politics.  (p. 234) [14] In addition to painting a
somewhat  uninspiring  vision  of  high  stakes  politics,  realism  also  substantially
challenges the place of law in this realm of social conduct. Let us recall a familiar
scenario. Imagine a society governed by rules, non-compliance with which ought to
incur sanctions. Imagine further  that in this society there is one family  of  singular
power and wealth. Although ordinarily norm compliant, when it suits family members
not  to  be  so,  they  diverge  from  rule-consistent  behaviour.  Because  of  their
pre-eminent position in the community, they can insulate themselves from the adverse
affects  of  sanctions  for  non-compliance.  Indeed,  prior  knowledge  of  this  capacity
means that family members are rarely called to account for their actions, let alone
found guilty when they are. Of course, rule non-compliance is an exceptional position,
even for family members, but not uncommon, especially when other pressing (self-)
interests  are  present.  Further,  this  insulation  from  societal  coercion  occasionally
extends to friends, when the family chooses so to permit,  as does the correlative
position – when enemies flout general rules, the family ensures that they are brought
to  book  and  suffer  the  full  sanctions  available  for  non-compliance.  In  such  a
community, we would be loath to describe the rules as ‘law', much less speak of the
‘rule of law'. Indeed, the society just sketched is best described as law-less, as one in
which rules are followed not as a function of communal membership but as a function
a party's strength and ability to resist collective coercion. [15] It takes only the merest
step on the ladder of abstraction to appreciate that the realm of Public International
Law is no more than our notional community writ large – a world in which hegemonic
powers obey ‘law' as a matter of convenience, not habit, and in which the likes of Iraq
are  required  to  observe  international  law  more  closely  than  the  friends  of  great
powers. Whatever one's view on the appropriateness of the US's military responses
to 9/11, whatever our lamentations of the UN system and the prospects of the ICC,
we are bound to face the fact that as in prior times of British, or French or Spanish
hegemony,  at  the  international  level,  ‘law'  is  akin  to  the  easy-going  normative
precepts in the paragraph above. Such voluntary adherence to rules is wildly alien to
our conventional understandings of what law is – indeed, the point is famously made
in  chapter  10  of  Hart's  The  Concept  of  Law.(8)  Those  few  international  lawyers
represented in this volume do not of course address such abstractions, but in their
consistent attacks on the USA's non-compliance with established norms of PIL, they
lay much of the groundwork for any such attack. Examples of the à la carte approach
to legal norms abound. Byers focuses on the US's attenuation of the recognised right
of self-defence to include military responses against states that support and harbour
terrorism  –  a  development  dependent  upon  not  consent  and  debate  but  the
preferences of a lead player. Indeed, should the coming months see a military attack
on Iraq, it will  doubtless be justified in the language of "anticipatory self defence",
itself  an  extension  of  the  extended  notion  of  self-defence  first  developed  in  the
Afghanistani theatre of the ‘War against Terrorism'. From the apparently ‘outdated'
Anti-Ballistic  Missile  Treaty  and  Geneva  Convention  governing  the  treatment  of
detainees  in  Guantanamo  Bay,  to  international  regulation  of  greenhouse  gas
emissions and the ICC, we note the development of a regime of international law that
applies to the USA and its ‘friends', whilst a parallel (and more demanding) regime
applies to all others. The distinction between the two is often the presence/absence of
the human rights lever  and to point  this  out in  dissent is  too often identified with
treachery.(9) [16] A yet more forceful attack along similar lines comes from Abdullahi
Ahmed  An-Na'im,  whose  chapter  title  –  Upholding  International  Legality  Against
Islamic and American Jihad – is likely immediately to raise the hackles of those who
do not recognise an equivalence between the recent actions of al-Qaeda and the US
government.  He  professes  an  inability  to  appreciate  any  moral,  political  or  legal
difference between this jihad by the United States against those it deems to be its
enemies  and  the  jihad  by  Islamic  groups  against  those  they  deem  to  be  their
enemies.  (p.  163)  [17]  Thus  armed,  An-Na'im  is  able  to  compare  the  events  of
September 11, 2001 with those of October 7, 2001. Readers may well wonder about
the latter  date.  It  was on that  day that  the US retaliated against  the Taliban and
al-Qaeda cells in Afghanistan. The events are separable only by the "differences in
power" between the combatants, not the "power of difference" between "civilisations".
Underlying this is the claim that because the US acted without recourse to certain
institutional arrangements and processes of international law. We might agree that,
The actions of the United States since October 7 cannot be accepted as being in
conformity with international legality unless they are scrutinised and approved by the
institutional and procedural requirements of that system (p. 167) but there is of course
a prior question – are those arrangements and processes legal in character? [18]
An-Na'im gives us chapter and verse on American indifference to international legal
authority  –  from  ignoring  the  ICJ  in  the  1980s  in  respect  of  illegal  activities  in
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Nicaragua and the invasion of  Panama, to  the persistent  problem of  Taliban and
al-Qaeda detainees and the refusal to entertain a legal trial for bin Laden, should he
ever be apprehended – concluding quite reasonably that the permanent members of
the Security Council "have conspired to paralyse and marginalise the UN system for
their own political interests." (p. 171) But if that is so, what and where are the legal
qualities of this regime? Cabals of this nature (11) bear little resemblance with the
characteristics of norm adherence, consistency and not being the judge in one's own
cause that we conventionally understand to be constituent features of a legal order. It
may well be the case that the system as it currently exists requires developmental
investment, as An-Na'im urges, but until  then one is bound to wonder if  the terse
analyses of the Waltz et al do not have the firmer grasp on what the international
order actually is. IV. Wrapping Up [19] Despite the generally impressive tenor of this
collection, one might note that of the thirty-two contributors, only two work outside the
Anglo-American  academy,  both  of  whom  –  Raja  Mohan  (Delhi)  and  Acharya
(Singapore)  –  work  in  English.  Quite  apart  from scholars  working  in  the  ‘Muslim
world', could not the critical edge of this work have been honed by drawing in South
and  Central  American  scholars?  As  is  noted  at  various  points,  due  to  their  own
extensive experiences as objects of American foreign policy, this is a part of the world
with a distinctive response to 9/11, yet first hand accounts are absent herein. And
given the affiliation of  the present  journal,  one regrets the absence of  continental
European scholars. In particular, French perspectives might have been particularly
piquant. This is a rather narrow sample of opinion for a subject matter of avowedly
global  concern.  If  this  work  sets  out  to  be  a  comprehensive  survey,  then  these
exclusions  substantially  undercut  that  ambition.  Secondly,  the  sheer  range  of
contributors does have a cost, namely the inevitable payoff between scope and depth.
This unease is augmented by the fact that a number of the pieces under review were
first published in Newsweek or such organs, and very few run beyond a dozen pages.
At times there is a journalistic quality to some of the writing. [20] On balance, such
shortcomings  are  forgivable  in  the  context  of  a  book  which  does  manage  so
successfully to present diverse analyses of the ‘new', new world order in a way that is
stimulating to a variety of specialist audiences, and to the interested generalist. Issues
from military intelligence to novel models of war and financial constraints on terrorist
groups to the link with the Palestinian question are all intelligently surveyed. Skilful
ordering of the essays (Byers is followed by Chomsky, Gray by Halliday) contributes
too to the editors' ambition (largely fulfilled) of sharply juxtaposing conflicting views so
as to bring to the fore the stakes of the debate. By taking seriously the grievances of
many in the Islamic world, the ‘south' more generally, and those who are not wholly
enamoured by the Bush administration, the end product goes a long way towards
legitimating dissent  in  an arena where deviation from the  official  line is  too often
characterised as subversion. By proceeding in the face of this pervasive attitude – if
you are not with us, you are against us – the editors and contributors deserve our
attention and thanks. As Der Derian puts it in his innovative piece, Detective work and
some  courage  are  needed  because  questions  about  the  root  causes  or  political
intentions  of  the  terrorist  acts  have  been  either  silenced  by  charges  of  ‘moral
equivalency' or rendered moot by claims that the exceptional nature of the act placed
it outside political discourse: explanation is identified as exoneration. (p. 102)
*  Researcher,  Department  of  Law,  European  University  Institute,  Florence  –
n.s.ghaleigh@fulbrightweb.org.  Editor  (with  Christian  Joerges),  Darker  Legacies  of
Law in Europe: The Shadow of National Socialism and Fascism over Europe and its
Legal  Traditions  (Oxford:  Hart,  forthcoming).  Parenthetic  references  are  to  pages
numbers in the volume under review. Thanks to Fernando Mendez, Megan Metters
and Ali Nobil Ahmad for comments on previous drafts.
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would  permit  a  withdrawal  from treaty  obligations.  Given  his  own view as to  the
somewhat  marginal  import  of  9/11,  that  would  presumably  not  suffice  as  a
"fundamental change of interests".
(8) HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994)
(9) On this, see A Neier, "The Military Tribunal on Trial", New York Review of Books,
February 14, 2002, 7-8.
(10) Principally, authority from the UN Security Council sanctioning the use of force,
pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
(11) By pleasingly coincidence, the permanent members of the UN Security Council,
like Charles II's committee of ministers (the original ‘cabal') also number five.
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